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The Conflict over ‘homosexuality’, which has embroiled the Anglican Communion 
over the past 15 years, has not primarily been a conflict about homosexuality, or even 
about sexuality per se. Rather, we argue that the conflict has been so intense because 
‘homosexuality’ has become a salient symbol, to which different Anglican 
constituencies (Evangelical, Liberal, and Anglo-Catholic) have brought their own 
agenda. The conflict does not simply reflect a pre-existing division between ‘liberal’ 
and ‘conservative’, but the emerging schism reflects the construction of a new religio-
cultural identity of ‘Anglican Orthodoxy’, which has increasingly polarised the 
Communion. Drawing on interviews with 70 Anglicans directly affected by the 
conflict in the UK and North America (including and with particular focus on 18 
bishops and archbishops) we explore the symbolic politics of homosexuality and the 
emergence of new configurations of Anglicanism. We suggest that the symbols of the 
conflict and the competing parties to the conflict are mutually constitutive 
constructions, and that attention to the processes of symbolic construction and 
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THE CRISIS IN THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION 
Since the mid-1990s, the global Anglican Communion has been caught up in an 
increasingly intense conflict over the role of gays and lesbians in the church. In the 
lead up to the Lambeth conference in 1998 (a decennial conference of Anglican 
Bishops from across the globe) the dispute began in earnest at the international level 
(Bates 2005: 158ff, Hassett 2007:55ff). The conference drafted Resolution 1.10, 
which was intended to serve as a compromise resolution but did little to quell the 
conflict. It identifies “homosexual practice as incompatible with scripture” while it 
also “calls on all our people to minister pastorally and sensitively to all irrespective of 
sexual orientation and to condemn irrational fear of homosexuals” (Lambeth 1998 
1.10 (d)). Since the resolution left the more militant parties on both sides feeling 
dissatisfied, it may well have intensified the situation. 
Lambeth 1998 thus failed to resolve the tension building both within and 
between different national churches (‘Provinces’) of the Communion. In the year 
2000, some conservative ‘Global South’ bishops began ordaining ‘missionary 
bishops’ to the United States, arguing that The Episcopal Church had forfeited its 
right to be seen as a legitimate church because of its failure to act decisively against 
homosexuality, and as such the southern bishops asserted that its actions were not an 
incursion into the territory of legitimate bishops (Hassett 2007: 132ff). In 2002, the 
synod of the Diocese of New Westminster in Western Canada passed a motion in 
favour of public rites for blessing same sex unions. A number of conservatives walked 
out of the synod. It was in 2003, however, that the situation erupted into a full crisis, 
when openly gay candidates were put forward as the bishops of New Hampshire and 
of Reading in the Diocese of Oxford. After a considerable controversy within the 
Church of England, Jeffrey Johns withdrew his name, but the consecration of Gene 
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Robinson as Bishop of New Hampshire was approved by the General Assembly of the 
Episcopal Church (TEC). Such was the ongoing rancour that several hundred bishops 
boycotted the Lambeth 2008 meetings, many of whom attended an alternative 
meeting in Jerusalem the month before, called the Global Anglican Futures 
Conference (GAFCON).   
 This crisis in the Anglican Communion represents a new development in its 
history; although the transnational network of churches has experienced bitter 
theological disputes in the past hundred years, such tensions did not threaten to split-
up the Communion, as the current crisis most certainly does. In this paper, we argue 
that homosexuality as such is not the cause of the dispute, but that it represents a 
“presenting symptom” (a term we have taken from interview respondents) of a wider 
range of tensions and grievances within its member churches. The position one takes 
on ordaining gay and lesbian bishops and blessing homosexual partnerships has 
become a symbolic marker around which differing (and competing) interests within 
the Communion are constructing strategic partnerships. Some opponents of 
homosexuality are using the dispute to frame a new religious identity as ‘Orthodox 
Anglicans’. This conflict cannot simply be reduced to the effects of a so-called 
“culture war” between “liberals” and “conservatives,” terms which do not fit well in a 
number of the local socio-political cultures discussed here, these basic poles 
stemming from a US context. Such a binary is further complicated by the 
transnational nature of the dispute within Anglicanism, as well as the different 
concerns that differing constituencies in these Provinces attach to the question of 
homosexuality. To counter such an interpretation of the conflict, the issue of 
homosexuality is described as a symbol, in the broad sense developed by Kniss 
(1997). The essay demonstrates how this “cultural object” has been constructed and is 
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being deployed in ways that are effectively redrawing the moral and ecclesial map of 
Anglican identities and creating, at least provisionally, a binary opposition which 
threatens to create a schism in the global Communion, as well as within national 
Anglican churches. While other papers stemming from our research focus on 
organisational factors (references withheld), here we are concerned primarily with the 
role of symbols in the construction of religious identities, and their role in the process 
of reconfiguring the basic fault-lines within a religious community. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The vast majority of the writing on the conflict has come from theologians and 
leaders of Anglican Churches worldwide. This growing literature is primarily 
concerned with taking positions on the issue itself, or with holding the unity of the 
Church together, and not with understanding the social sources and dynamics of the 
conflict per se (cf. Gibson 2002; Radner & Turner 2006; Groves 2008; O’Donovan 
2009).  A much smaller literature has attempted to explain why this conflict has been 
so heated, and why it has emerged at this historical moment. The most straightforward 
explanation is that offered by Philip Jenkins (2007: 235-50). For Jenkins, the 
development of the conflict over homosexuality in the Anglican Communion is 
largely demographic. Over the course of the 20
th
 Century, the Anglican Churches of 
the global South have grown dramatically whilst the Anglican Churches of Great 
Britain, Canada, and the USA have shrunk both in absolute numbers and in 
comparison to the general population (cf. Bruce 2002). Thus, for example, regular 
attendance in the Church of England amounts to less than a million, compared to the 
17.5 million members claimed by the Anglican Church of Nigeria (Chapman 2006:9). 
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Even if this latter figure is greatly exaggerated, it still points to a demographic shift in 
the Anglican churches worldwide.   
The churches of the Global South tend to be more conservative in matters 
relating to homosexuality (although there are notable individual and national 
exceptions); the Northern churches are not only losing members, but also are tending 
to become more liberal in questions of sexuality. Such ‘liberalisation’ is not evenly 
spread through the Northern churches, however. Alasdair Crockett and David Voas 
(2003) found that the divide between the pro-gay (young and liberal) anti-gay (older 
and conservative) in the Church of England was more marked than in the society as a 
whole, with young, liberal Anglicans less likely to hold negative views on 
homosexuality than their non-religious peers.   
 Miranda Hassett (2007) has argued that the conflict cannot be explained 
simply in terms of the changing demographics of the Anglican Communion and their 
different perspectives over the role of homosexuality. Drawing on fieldwork among 
conservative dissidents who had left TEC, and among Ugandan Anglicans, Hassett 
shows how the conflict has been orchestrated to a considerable degree by dissident 
American Episcopalians who have used their international relationships and alliances 
as leverage within the national religious field. Guardian journalist Stephen Bates’s A 
Church at War (2005) uncovers further evidence for the linkages between northern 
conservatives and southern bishops, but assigns more weight to the influence of the 
Evangelical wing of the Church of England (see also Hunt 2002). The North 
American conservative dissidents we have interviewed have often emphasised the 
importance of international partners (particularly bishops) as allies in their struggle 
within the local diocese or in the national church. One dissident put it bluntly: 
“without them, we’d have been sunk”. This he argued was the fundamental advantage 
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of conservative dissidents in the Anglican Church, compared with those in other 
“liberal dominated” denominations (North America 5). 
 Over the last twenty years, there has been a resurgence of sociological studies 
concerned with schisms and intra-denominational conflict, and these have 
considerable bearing on the conflict in the Anglican Communion. This work 
illuminates conflicts between fundamentalists and their opponents (Ammerman 
1990), over the accommodation to the modern world (Kniss 1996, 1997), the 
ordination of women (Chaves 1997), as well as the broad-sweeping changes that 
occurred within the Catholic Church at Vatican II (Wilde 2007). Most of the research 
in this area has focused on religious conflict in the United States and has endeavoured 
to comprehend such conflicts within the particular moral universe of American 
religion (Kniss 1997), as well as the cleavages between liberals and conservatives 
(Wuthnow 1988; Wellman 2008). This literature thus needs to be adapted to a 
transnational religious organisation like the Anglican Communion, where the tradition 
has not (at least until recently) been divisible into ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ camps, 
and these terms do not work at all well for describing the particular moral universes in 
which many Anglican churches are situated (not least the UK and Ireland, but also 
churches of the Global South).  
 Schisms and internal conflict within denominations are generally understood 
in the sociological literature as the product of intensifying internal divisions, rather 
than reflecting doctrinal disagreement per se.  Liebman, Sutton and Wuthnow (1988), 
in their study of American denominational schisms, identify a series of factors that 
correlate with increased likelihood of denominational schism. Those churches which 
suffer a serious split are typically large and growing; they tend to have congregational 
polities, whereas churches with Episcopal leadership, and that appoint clergy at the 
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synodical or presbytery level (rather than at the parish level), and which are members 
of networks or federations, are less prone to schism. Sutton and Chaves (2004) refine 
this argument, adding that schism is often a reaction against efforts by church elites to 
achieve organizational consolidation. They also emphasize that those mobilizing 
dissent require the ideological and social resources to do so, and the confidence that 
they possess sufficient reasons to expect the loyalty of a large segment of the faithful. 
 Some aspects of the conflict within the Anglican Communion do not fit 
particularly well with the patterns these studies describe, although we see the 
ideological resources as highly important in the Anglican case. While the Anglican 
Communion as a whole may be growing (though this is certainly open to question), 
the Anglican Provinces in which the conflict is most pronounced are shrinking; they 
are by definition both episcopally led and integrated into a federation (the Anglican 
Communion); the most conflicted Provinces are also those in which organizational 
elites are frequently criticized for not consolidating power. If anything, the leadership 
of the Anglican Communion has sought to consolidate authority in response to the 
conflict and division (most recently by means of an Anglican Covenant, reference 
withheld). 
 While we accept the basic arguments about factors outlined above that tend to 
encourage conflict, division and schism, the ways in which the Anglican dispute does 
not seem structurally preconditioned for such conflict suggests the importance of 
carefully considering the dynamics of constructing and deploying symbolic resources; 
as we will suggest below, these symbolic-ideological resources were not given before 
the crisis, but have emerged in the midst of the conflict. This is by no means to 
suggest that the current Anglican dispute is predominantly over questions of doctrine; 
rather, it is to complement the more structural arguments by showing how such 
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symbolic elements are themselves shaped by the denominational conflict, and are 
mobilized by differing groups in different ways and for various purposes. The parties 
to the conflict and the symbols they use are mutually constitutive: the symbols 
deployed as ideological resources in the conflict have emerged from longstanding 
divisions and are contributing substantially to the alignment of the basic structures of 
the Anglican Communion (not to mention individual Provinces) itself. 
 More than any other work, Mark Chaves’ Ordaining Women (1997) has 
demonstrated the role that denominational fights can be thoroughly symbolic. His 
work shows that denominational policy often functions less as a guide for practice 
than as a marker of the denomination’s place in the American religious field, whether 
as a ‘liberal’ denomination that ordains women, or as a ‘conservative’ one that does 
not. In fact, Chaves shows that policies on the role of women have historically made 
little difference to the actual role of women within ecclesiastical organisations. In 
short, official church policies are more symbolic markers of a denomination’s place in 
the religious field than a reflection of, or guide for, church practice, and struggles over 
the ordination of women have had much more to do with the attempt to place a given 
denomination in this larger denominational field. We show below, however, that 
symbolic and ideological resources are not always already given. In other words, it is 
not always a matter of dissident groups simply using pre-existing symbolic identities 
and markers; rather, some important symbolic resources have been constructed in the 
course of the conflict itself (particularly the notion of ‘Anglican Orthodoxy’) as a 
means of bringing together groups which would have previously had little common 
cause, and other symbols, notably homosexuality, have taken on new salience. 
Kniss’s (1997) research on the history of conflict in American Mennonite 
communities likewise provides an important re-conception of symbols as both stakes 
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and resources in intra-denominational struggle. Kniss argues that symbols have not 
been taken seriously enough by students of social movements, having often been 
treated either as epiphenomenal to the ‘real’ material factors (resource mobilization 
theory, orthodox Marxism), or else understood as purely instrumental or strategic 
devices (such as framing theory). Symbols differ from forms of power such as 
material resources, which can be divided up; this can result in conflicts that are 
surprisingly intense, particularly when compared to struggles over other kinds of 
resources. Kniss shows how these disputes can become especially intractable, because 
symbols are not divisible, like material resources are.  
Some symbols are more salient than others, and such salience may vary over 
space and through time. Kniss observes that conflicts over abstract symbols are less 
likely than over concrete ones, because they are more ambiguous and can be 
interpreted and re-interpreted in a variety of ways.  Conflict is more likely over 
concrete symbols, particularly those that Kniss calls ‘cultural objects’ (forms of attire, 
the organisation of space for worship), or ‘symbolic practices’ (the legitimacy of 
certain forms of rituals or the qualifications for particular offices of authority or 
honour). These are closest to the ‘surface of social life…[and so] are more likely to be 
the object of contention’ (1997: 136).  
Despite the very significant differences between Kniss’s American 
Mennonites, and the traditions and structures of the global Anglican Communion, the 
list of contentious issues in both historical and contemporary Anglicanism has 
certainly tended to focus on concrete symbols: the legitimacy of marrying previously 
divorced people, whether women can serve as priests and bishops, the content and 
form of shared rituals (the Prayer Book), as well as the more recent conflict over gay 
bishops, and the blessing of same-sex unions. Although there are clearly identified 
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communities within the Anglican churches (Anglo-Catholic, Evangelical and Liberal, 
as we shall discuss below), conflicts between them have historically not tended to 
focus on the more abstract symbolic codes that these groups embody, but rather on the 
more visible, tangible symbols that also represent issues of concern to the various 
parties. Thus, while there exist vast and significant differences among Anglicans on 
points of theological belief (interpretation of the Nicean Creed, the divinity of Jesus, 
the efficacy of the sacraments, etc.), these doctrinal issues are not the primary 
questions that have brought the Communion to the point of schism. Instead, it is the 
more concrete question of homosexuality that has provided a focal point for groups 
with different theological concerns and agendas (some of whom have reinvented 
themselves as ‘Orthodox Anglicans’) to rally around.  
What seems to give the question of homosexuality its particular power is the 
way that it has come to serve as a “condensational symbol”, in Edelman’s (1964) 
terms, particularly for those with the newly formed ‘Orthodox Anglican’ identity. For 
Edelman, condensational symbols are distinct from “referential symbols” (which 
point to concrete and transparent realities) because of their ability to evoke powerful 
emotions. In subsequent work (1988), he argues that these symbolic constructions are 
essential for the definition of opponents and enemies, as well as for gathering and 
mobilising allies. Thus, the construction of effective condensational symbols has been 
an important component of organising opponents of the ‘liberal agenda’. 
 In her work on Vatican II, Melissa Wilde (2007) argues that adherence to 
particular beliefs had an impact on the capacity of different groups of bishops to 
organise social and doctrinal change. This led ultimately to significant and sweeping 
changes in the practices of the Catholic Church. The progressive bishops were as 
successful as they were because they accepted the notion of collegiality (that 
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assembled, the bishops councils have the same authority as the Pope) whereas the 
traditionalists held on to the Vatican I conception of the centralised authority of the 
Pope, and were therefore slow to organise in opposition to these changes. The new 
symbolic re-configurations of the Anglican tradition have already led to widespread 
institutionalisations of these symbols, most significantly in the Global Anglican 
Futures Conference (GAFCON, to be discussed below) as well as to the formation of 
a separate, “Orthodox Anglican” Province in North America—the latter representing 
a radical departure from the traditional, geographically bounded, dioceses of the 
Anglican (and Roman Catholic) tradition. While the final outcome is yet to be seen, 
the concrete effects of the new symbolic configurations are already clearly being felt. 
    
HISTORICAL CONFIGURATIONS OF ANGLICANISM 
The Church of England, and following it, the Anglican Communion, has long 
been a rather ‘big tent’, encompassing a variety of different traditions, brokered by the 
‘Elizabethan compromise’ in the sixteenth century. This was given liturgical and 
theological support by the Book of Common Prayer, and by the influential writings of 
Richard Hooker. While it would be inappropriate to suggest that nineteenth and 
twentieth century configurations of Anglicanism are identical to the original parties to 
this compromise, there has long been an identifiable ‘Catholic’ stream in the Church 
of England, and at least some conservative Evangelical Anglicans trace their spiritual 
lineage to the Puritans (cf. Packer 1994). Perhaps the greatest stretch would be to see 
the Liberal stream as the inheritance of the sixteenth century Humanists. Nonetheless, 
if Hooker’s theology managed to integrate such disparate social and theological 
currents into a coherent Anglicanism, it is in part because of the insistence in his 
theology of understanding the relative authority of Tradition, Scripture and Reason in 
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light of each other. These represent the emphases of each of the major wings of the 
church: Anglo-Catholic (Tradition), Evangelical (Scripture) and Liberal (Reason). 
The Anglo-Catholic (or ‘High Church’) party, like the other parties of 
contemporary Anglicanism, in its current form owes a great deal to the 19
th
 Century 
revival of ‘Catholic’ spirituality and liturgy, not least as it was given impetus by the 
‘Tractarian’ movement, also known as the ‘Oxford Movement’. This group put great 
stock in recovering and reconstructing the traditions and teachings of the church, a 
renewed appreciation and appropriation of the writings of the Church Fathers, and 
fostering a ‘Catholic’ understanding of the sacraments and orders of ministry 
(particularly the apostolic succession and the authority of bishops). Anglo-Catholic 
services place strong emphasis on ‘traditional’ liturgical worship, often including 
bells, and incense. Some Anglo-Catholics, with a very ‘traditional’ view of the 
priesthood, have objected to the ordination of women; some have likewise objected 
because it introduces a further barrier to full communion with the Roman Catholic 
Church.  
The Evangelical Anglican party likewise owes a great deal to the movement’s 
19
th
 Century history, and has in many ways long been the mirror image of the Anglo-
Catholic party. The Evangelicals tend to emphasise the most ‘Protestant’ aspects of 
the Anglican tradition, and they put particular emphasis on the authority of scripture, 
giving less emphasis on the traditions, rites and structures to which the Anglo-
Catholics are particularly attached. Because they pay less heed to the church’s 
traditions or structures of authority, and tend towards liturgically simpler (and 
sometimes less recognisably Anglican) services, the Evangelicals have often been 
referred to as ‘Low Church’ Anglicans.  
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The ‘Liberal’ or ‘Broad Church’ party in Anglicanism has been the least well 
defined, and has undoubtedly been the least well organised of the three parties. The 
‘Modern Churchpeople’s Union’, founded at the end of the 19th Century, is perhaps 
the best representative of the core of the Liberal party. Their founding ‘objects’ 
insisted that ‘dogma is capable of reinterpretation and restatement in accordance with 
the clearer perception of truth attained by discovery and research’. From the 
beginning, they were firmly committed to working toward greater inclusiveness, and 
better ecumenical relations (Churchmen's Union for the Advancement of Liberal 
Religious Thought 1899). Because of the strong opposition between Anglo-Catholics 
and Evangelicals, the liberal party was sometimes able to portray itself, in opposition 
to the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Church factions as being ‘Broad Church’.      
 If the Anglo-Catholic, Evangelical and Liberal constituencies of the Anglican 
Tradition are identifiable groups, there has always been overlap and blurring at the  
boundaries, though the different borders have been much more rigidly maintained and 
defended at various times. The Venn diagram in Figure 1 represents the three parties, 
along with the theoretical possibilities of overlap, with no attempt to account for the 
different size of the communities. Estimating these would, at present, be an 
insurmountable task, given the significant differences between Provinces, and the 
manner in which such boundaries are more precarious and contested than usual at 
present; furthermore, the leaders of each group are prone to exaggerate the size of 
their constituency. Research on the comparative strength of Anglo-Catholic and 
Evangelical Parishes within the Church of England alone highlight the difficulties of 
even rough estimation (Francis and Lankshear 1996); that these constitute the primary 
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‘parties’ within Anglicanism, however, has been, nonetheless, universally accepted1 
(Chapman 2006).  
 
[note: FIGURE 1 to appear about here] 
 
 The areas in figure 1 where Liberals overlap with Evangelicals, and where 
they overlap with Anglo-Catholics on the other, have long been well populated 
territories, with relatively porous boundaries in both directions, though many may 
hold one identity to the exclusion of the other. In many respects, the current occupant 
of the See of Canterbury, Archbishop Rowan Williams, is a good exemplar of a 
Liberal Anglo-Catholic, as would be another former Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Michael Ramsey. Donald Coggan, 101
st
 Archbishop of Canterbury, could be seen as a 
representative of someone in the interstice between Liberals and Evangelicals, as 
would many proponents and sympathizers of “Post-Liberal Theology.” Many who 
identify themselves as ‘Open’-Evangelicals are also in, or at least close to, this 
overlap between Liberals and Evangelicals, even as this position has certainly become 
harder to hold in the wake of the present conflict. 
 For many years, by far and away the most problematic borderland, relatively 
uninhabited in most periods of Anglican history, and carefully guarded from both 
sides, has been the frontier between the Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals, sometimes 
seen as the primary distinction between ‘High’ and ‘Low’ Church  Anglicans. These 
two groups have long viewed each other with deep suspicion, and have run competing 
associations, seminaries and mission societies (both home and foreign). In fact, the 
                                                 
1
 Charismatic Anglicans also have played a minor role in the current crisis, but they are relatively 
marginal in terms of both numbers and influence. For the purposes of the present dispute, Charismatic 
Anglicans are best conceived as part of the Evangelical party (although not accepted by all 
Evangelicals), rather than a party unto themselves. 
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term ‘Anglo-Catholic Evangelical’ would have, until very recently, been seen as a 
contradiction in terms. Evangelicals have been known to refer to Anglo-Catholics as 
‘Biscuit Worshippers’ for their highly ‘Catholic’ liturgical sensibilities, fondness for 
Rome and the Virgin Mary, love of tradition, and emphasis on the importance of the 
Episcopacy. Anglo-Catholics have often, in turn seen their ‘Low Church’ co-
religionists as “Bible Thumpers” who are Anglican in little but their name, holding a 
‘Low’ view of the traditions, sacraments, priesthood and apostolic succession of the 
episcopate, and holding services hard to distinguish from those of the Baptists. The 
new ‘Orthodox Anglican’ identity, forged in the context of the homosexuality 
disputes, is to a very great extent an attempt to suture together parts of these two 
parties long in fierce competition , or at very least,  deeply suspicious of  one another.  
  The conflict over homosexuality is in the process of re-drawing the boundaries 
within the Churches of the Anglican Communion. Even if the conflict is not about 
sexual orientation per se, homosexuality has become the most salient symbol of the 
conflict, and a marker that constructs a divide between ‘Liberals’ and ‘Orthodox 
Anglicans’. Whether the new divisions within Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical 
communities (marked by the response to the ‘homosexuality question’), or the 




Our focus on the dynamics of conflict in the current crisis of the Anglican 
Communion allows us to examine the processes of symbol construction, and the 
attendant reconfiguration of the longstanding parties of the church in light of new 
identities and boundaries that have been constructed. A case study method, using 
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semi-structured qualitative interviews with purposively sampled key leaders of the 
church, offers the possibility of gaining further insight into the processes of the 
Anglican conflict as it has unfolded, with particular attention to the place of symbolic 
conflict in the dispute. In this essay, we explore the ways in which symbols are being 
interpreted, constructed and deployed by differing agents involved in the conflict, as 
well as the attendant (and very concrete) reconfiguration of the parties of the church.  
The data in this paper is derived from an ongoing study of the Anglican 
conflict, and to date includes 70 interviews in the United Kingdom and North 
America, including 18 interviews with influential bishops and archbishops as well as 
52 activists, clergy and involved laypeople (primarily in two particularly conflict-
ridden North American dioceses). In the essay we draw in particular on our interviews 
with bishops as they have proven the best able to give insight into the conflict in its 
most international dimensions. We use the other interviews primarily as background. 
Given the Episcopal structure of the Anglican tradition, Bishops have particular 
responsibilities in the decision-making processes of the church, and are privy to 
conversations at the highest levels of the church, both nationally and internationally. 
Subsequent papers will deal with the conflict as it is manifest closer to the ground, in 
dioceses and parishes, as well as with the more structural aspects of the conflict 
(references withheld), and the role of communication networks. 
For this study we recruited senior or influential bishops, those who have made 
some, though (as we learned) not all, of their various thoughts about the current crisis 
known, with the thought that these key leaders would be best positioned to help us 
further understand both the social and theological dynamics of the crisis. Because our 
sample of bishops consists of a relatively small number of well-known and influential 
individuals, we are unable to give the exact number of representatives from the 
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different Provinces, or the precise proportion of representatives of the different wings 
of the church without risking breaking our commitment to absolute anonymity and 
confidentiality. Given the current climate, in which relations are sometimes not only 
hostile but also litigious (especially in North America, but potentially, also in the 
UK), the exercise of particular caution is called for in this matter.  
We have conducted interviews with representatives in the Churches of 
England and Ireland, The Episcopal Church of Scotland, The Episcopal Church 
(USA) and the Anglican Church of Canada, as well as in the new ‘Orthodox 
Anglican’ Province of North America. The greater part of our sample of  bishops are 
from the UK, and the greater proportion of the activists, deans, priests and involved 
laypeople, were sampled from conflict hotspots in the USA and Canada. All of our 
bishops are church leaders with not only diocesan, but also national and international 
responsibilities, reputations and profiles. Our initial sampling frame for bishops was 
designed to gain an understanding of the conflict from the vantage point of actors with 
the widest possible range positions on the ‘homosexuality question’, as well as good 
representation from each of the three traditional wings of the church (Anglo-Catholic, 
Liberal and Evangelical). The bishops we interviewed fall roughly into even parts in 
favour, against, and those who try to take some kind of via-media on the 
homosexuality question. Amongst the Bishops, our response rate was 75%, with good 
representation of a range of positions on the current debate, as well as from the 
different wings of the church. We have no information about the reasons for non-
participation for those who declined; all but one (who was ‘already overcommitted’) 
simply never responded to our initial request, nor to our attempts to follow up. Our 
sample of bishops is exclusive of representatives of churches in the Global South. As 
a result, we can say nothing with certainty in this paper about the internal dynamics 
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of, for example, the Anglican Church in Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya, and 
our ability to discuss the perspectives leaders in those churches bring to the 
international conflict is very limited. These are undoubtedly important perspectives, 
but have already been carefully documented and insightfully studied by Hassett 
(2007), and we intend to develop these avenues in our own further research.  
We conducted our interviews with bishops face to face, at a location of their 
choosing, and using a semi-structured interview format. The interview schedule was 
designed to elicit the bishops’ reflections on the conflict, as expert informants, rather 
than to elaborate on their personal position on the debate. Unsurprisingly, the 
positions that they took on the debate informed their observations about the conflict, 
and all were keen to talk about their own views on the matter. While we found the 
bishops sometimes stuck close to an established script, we were often surprised by 
their candour, and several referred to our guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality, 
as they discussed Episcopal colleagues, or the challenges and difficulties in their 
dioceses.  
Interviews consisted of eight questions, and interviews were scheduled for one 
hour in duration. We began by asking the bishops to reflect on why they thought that 
the current conflicts were so intense relative to other conflicts in the history of 
Anglicanism, followed by a series of questions designed to get them to think aloud 
about the relationship between the current conflict and differing positions within the 
church on the nature of the Bible, God and the church itself. We asked them questions 
about structural/organisational factors that might have intensified the conflict in the 
communion, including their thoughts about the changing (global) demographics of the 
church and about the role of para-church pressure groups. Finally, we concluded our 
interview with a question about whether there was anything that they thought was 
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important for a complete understanding of the current crisis, but which we might not 
have thought to ask them. The focus on the ‘symbolic politics’ of the conflict was 
something that had not been on our agenda when we began our interviews, and 
emerged from these conversations.    
 
FINDINGS 
In presenting our findings, we begin with a discussion of the way that the bishops 
understand the question of homosexuality largely as, in their words, a ‘presenting 
symptom’ (or ‘presenting issue’), and what they see as the underlying disease. We 
then discuss how the homosexuality question has become a symbolic marker which 
has divided Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics, who find now find themselves at odds 
with some of those in their own party in the church. We then show how Evangelical 
and Anglo-Catholic opponents of gay bishops and same sex blessings have created a 
new umbrella identity, “Orthodox Anglicans”, and how they have constructed their 
opponents as “liberals” (despite the fact that many who differ with them on the 
question of homosexuality do not understand themselves in this way). In this way, we 
demonstrate how responses to the ‘homosexuality question’ and the newly 
constructed identity of ‘Anglican Orthodoxy’ are in the process of reconfiguring the 
basic organisation of parties in Anglicanism. 
 The homosexuality conflict is so intense, at least in part, because it constructs 
and demarcates a new fracture on the Anglican terrain, one which cuts through even 
the traditional parties, and is used to challenge the basic organisation of the Anglican 
Churches, both nationally and internationally. While there may be widespread 
agreement about the secondary nature of homosexuality as a presenting symptom, this 
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does not mean that the bishops agree among themselves on what the underlying 
disease is, and there is, at this moment, no consensus on how it ought to be treated. 
 
Homosexuality as a ‘Presenting Symptom’ 
The bishops we interviewed took the position that that the current conflict was 
not solely about homosexuality, and with one exception, did not tend to think that the 
conflict was not even primarily about sexuality. Rather, more than half of the bishops 
used the same metaphor to describe the relationship of homosexuality to the conflict 
in the Communion in medical terms. They described homosexuality as the ‘presenting 
issue’, ‘presenting problem’ or ‘presenting symptom’2; differing views on 
homosexuality are not the cause of the problem, rather, other differences are coming 
to the fore in the context of arguments about sexuality.   
 Having explained why he is convinced that homosexuality is wrong, 
incompatible with Scripture and with Christian faith, Bishop John argued that those 
within the church who are advocating blessing same sex unions, or allowing for 
practicing gay and lesbian clergy and bishops are effectively changing the Gospel. 
Saint Paul, he argued, included gay sex on a list of sins from which Christians need to 
repent, and some modern church leaders are undermining this teaching by advocating 
the acceptance of same-sex relationships. As he explained, changing what counts as 
‘sin’ changes the very nature of the gospel: 
So in a sense the very real issue: the debate in the church isn’t about 
homosexuality at all. Homosexuality is the presenting problem. I think we all 
wish it was a different one but it’s the presenting problem of how seriously we 
                                                 
2
 This was not a metaphor we had heard used prior to beginning our research, but it has become a 
commonly heard phrase, finding its way even into discussions in the mainstream media, at least in the 
UK (see Gledhill 2010). To date we have been unable to identify its origins, or when the phrase 
became commonly used. 
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take the authority of the Bible and especially of how seriously we are 
committed to the faith of the apostles.  
 
Bishop Luke, on the other side of the dispute (in favour of full inclusion of gays and 
lesbians), also used the language of the ‘presenting issue’. In Britain and North 
America, he explains that some conservatives get very upset about the question of 
homosexuality because it suggests to them that 
the church is abandoning its historic traditions. And so, all the other issues 
about the authority of scripture, what the church has historically taught, the 
understanding of marriage… It seems that suddenly in giving way pastorally 
to the needs of gay and lesbian people, you’re running a coach and horses 
through the whole tradition, so people get very anxious about it. So, apart from 
the personal issues, you get both positive and negative reactions because 
people have got agendas of their own.  
You’ve got all those other issues. So it’s become a political issue. It’s a 
campaigning issue. So it’s the presenting issue for a battle for power in the 
church.  
 
While Bishop Luke, like a number of other bishops we talked to, recognises that the 
homosexuality issue is deeply personal for individuals, including some who have 
‘unresolved issues’ with their own sexuality, this does not account for the intensity of 
the conflict as a whole. Rather, it has much more to do with the way that the sexuality 
issue has become ‘political’ and a ‘campaigning issue’, part and parcel of a ‘battle for 
power in the church’.    
 Many of the bishops acknowledged the ‘symbolic’ nature of the conflict, and 
several of the bishops argued, much as Kniss (1997) does, that this symbolic 
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component of the dispute is one of the primary reasons it seems so intense and so 
intractable. Bishop Timothy, who was the first to make us think seriously about the 
symbolic dimensions of the current conflict, makes a comparison with the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, where tough legislation had swept away political patronage, and 
resulted in substantial change. But, he explains, 
what trips you up is the symbolic stuff because that’s the enduring stuff: ‘I 
have walked down that road for the last 150 years’… [These may not be issues 
of substance but] they have a visceral connection with identity… with who 
people are. So they’re not negotiable. And I guess that in some elements the 
gay issue has become symbolic which means that they’re not negotiable. 
Despite Bishop Timothy’s helpful analogy, in the Anglican ‘sexuality’ conflict, it is 
not so readily apparent how the particular symbols connect to particular religious 
identities and the groups that hold them. Or perhaps, it would be more accurate to say 
that the use of such symbols is in the process of reshaping Anglican identities and the 
primary historical ‘parties’ of Anglicanism.   
 
Widening Divisions Within the Evangelical Party of the Church 
 Bishop David, who considers himself an ‘open’ Evangelical, lamented the way 
in which the Evangelical wing of Church has become increasingly divided between 
more ‘open’ (or ‘liberal’) Evangelicals and hard-line conservatives on the question of 
sexuality. Some of his fellow Evangelicals, he argues, often see themselves as the 
heirs to the Puritans, who never got their chance to ‘complete the Reformation’. He 
argues that some of these had long been “itching for a fight”, and had been quite 
explicit that the sexuality question was their chance for a “call to arms” that might be 
taken up by a broader constituency.  The sexuality question was thus from the start 
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immediately embroiled and embedded in longer-standing issues, concerns and 
politics, including the question of how the Bible operates as an authoritative text in 
the Church—something which is of central importance for Evangelicals. Bishop 
David explains that while  
… all Anglicans will say that the Bible is our fundamental authority… 
Evangelicals will almost stop there even though they are paying lip service to 
tradition and reason… And then classic Anglicanism will talk about the Bible 
interpreted through tradition and with the use of reason and taking into 
account experience… There are a number of ways of configuring that ground. 
…but all of us would start with the Bible.  
 But of course the conservative evangelical will be suspicious of what 
everybody else means by the authority of the Bible. And that suspicion 
eventually has led to: ‘okay, let’s test it out, let’s see what they mean by this’. 
And the feeling of having perhaps retreated and been sucked into the church as 
a whole has now been challenged: ‘okay, let’s see what the colour of their 
money is and what they really mean by the authority of the Bible’. And then 
you run into the hermeneutical questions…You’ve got this one issue taken as 
a litmus test for…liberalism. 
 
Bishop David is not an advocate of blessing gay unions, nor of consecrating gay 
bishops, but he does see it as an issue on which Christians can legitimately disagree. 
When we suggested that it is often most difficult to hold a position in the middle as an 
issue gets increasingly polarised, Bishop David expressed a considerable amount of 
exasperation. 
I think that’s right! Of much more concern, and this is part of that, is that we 
don’t seem to be able to discuss in that area now. A banner is raised, a word is 
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said, a phrase is used and you know immediately which side of this divide 
you’re on. And people listen out for trigger phrases, for symbolic phrases and 
words. So that middle area of intellectual debate, of real honest grappling, is 
getting evacuated as people just make it into a political scrap instead of a 
theological debate. I think Rowan Williams is classically one of those people 
who gets castigated from both sides as he tries to hold us together. What I’m 
saying is that we need to be able, within Anglicanism, to have the big tent that 
allows us to have the same tools and reach different conclusions with integrity 
and to live with that integrity of difference. Why this issue, for instance? 
There are seven texts on this issue and two thousand verses on poverty in the 
Bible. So I say, “For heaven sake, don’t make this a Communion breaking 
issue”.      
 
Bishop David here explains the way that the symbol of homosexuality marks a divide, 
or better, constructs a sharp boundary between those who ‘really’ accept the authority 
of the Scriptures, and those whose orthodoxy, and even the authenticity of their 
Christian faith, is questionable. By making the question of gays in the church the 
‘litmus test’ of orthodoxy, a new division is formed, dividing even the Evangelical 
wing of the church; it becomes very difficult for Anglicans who identify with, and 
consider themselves part of, the Evangelical wing of the church, but who do not share 
the view that such this issue ought to be the dividing line between authentic Christians 
and apostates. 
 When we interviewed Evangelicals who are resolutely opposed to gay 
blessings and gay bishops, and who do see it as a communion-breaking issue, they 
found the idea of ‘real’ Evangelicals who could take a different view of the seven 
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biblical texts thought to refer to homosexuality difficult to comprehend. Bishop John 
even seemed a bit surprised at the suggestion when it was put to him: 
I think the issue is that I can cope with somebody that’s a Christian seeking to 
be equally faithful to the Bible as I’m trying to be and who comes to a 
different conclusion but really wants to take the Bible seriously and argues on 
the basis of the Bible and says that I haven’t understood it properly. I might 
disagree with them but I can take that. But what I think is very difficult is for 
them to say, ‘I am a Christian and I respect the authority of the Bible’ but in a 
very cavalier manner, ‘I’m willing to dismiss the plain teaching of the Bible 
and 2000 years of the history of the church on holiness.’ 
 
 Although he knows other Evangelicals, including colleagues in the Episcopacy, who 
do not see the issue as one which must divide the damned from the saved, Bishop 
John is only able to see such a position as ‘cavalier’, and a dismissal of both Scripture 
and tradition, rather than something over which Evangelicals can—and do—disagree.  
 
New Anglo-Catholic Divisions 
 In England and the USA in particular, some Anglo-Catholics have, in the past 
several decades, objected vociferously to women priests, and more recently, to 
women bishops, but, with a few notable exceptions, English (or Irish, Scottish or 
Welsh) Anglo-Catholics have made very little noise about homosexuality in the 
church. Evangelicals have been more open to the question of women priests and 
bishops, but have been more likely to be opposed to greater inclusion of gays and 
lesbians. One bishop went so far as to describe the Anglo-Catholic tradition in 
England as ‘a bit camp’ (Bishop Matthew), and another suggested that in England ‘the 
[Anglo-]Catholic wing is absolutely riddled with” homosexuality. “This,” Bishop 
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Luke explained, “is an agenda that they just don’t want to talk about, for obvious 
reasons. Women are the issue. They can’t deal with the gay issue, because the gay 
issue comes right close to home’ (Bishop Luke). This is certainly less true outwith the 
United Kingdom, where (conservative) Anglo-Catholics have been an important 
constituent part of the protest against the elevation of Gene Robinson, particularly 
within the USA. Several of the dioceses where there was the fiercest reaction to Gene 
Robinson (San Joaquin, San Antonio, Quincy) are strongly Anglo-Catholic dioceses, 
and were also, before leaving the Episcopal Church, the remaining holdouts to 
women’s ordination.  
 Anglo-Catholics are increasingly divided, not unlike the Evangelicals, 
between ‘Affirming’ Anglo-Catholics, and more their more traditionalist fellows. The 
former group tends to be open on the question of both women in the priesthood and 
episcopate, and on the question of homosexuality. For Conservative Anglo-Catholics, 
the Evangelical’s concern with Scripture is distinctly secondary. “It’s not just 
scripture”, Bishop Christopher explains, “It’s how the apostolic teaching is passed on 
and received and re-received in the church and what role scripture has to play in that 
process that are going on all the time, of course”. For conservative Anglo-Catholics, 
objections to gay bishops and blessing same sex unions stem much more from their 
understanding of the history of the church’s teaching on the theology of marriage (and 
what such a theology of marriage has to say about God), as well as worries about 
driving a further wedge between the Anglo- and Roman Catholic Churches. 
‘Deviation’ from the church’s historic teaching on such matters would mean that the 
Church stopped being the Church. Bishop Christopher reflects on some of the various 
challenges to the Church over the course of the twentieth century, setting the question 
of homosexuality in the church in a broader context, as he understands it:  
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In the ‘30s you have the confessing church issue and the Barmen Declaration 
and so on because the church was faced with an issue where it had to say, or at 
least some people had to say, “Being a disciple of Christ is simply inconsistent 
with the Nazi state”. Similarly, with South Africa, it happened on the question 
of race. In other parts of the world, it may happen on tribalism or the refusal to 
worship the emperor in Japan which resulted in so much persecution for 
Christians there. So I think that this sexuality issue in the contemporary West 
is just the issue that has presented itself. We may like it or not like it but that’s 
just the way it is. 
If the reasoning is noticeably different for traditionalist Anglo-Catholics compared 
with the Evangelicals, the position that this issue marks the boundary between the 
Church and a fallen and world, is nonetheless partially parallel. The remaining 
difference is whether there are two issues (women priests and homosexuality) or just 
one (which can be either women priests or homosexuality). If there is only one issue, 
it is more likely that traditional Anglo-Catholics will be more concerned about women 
(as is the case in The Church of England) than about homosexuality in the priesthood.  
 
Constructing ‘Orthodox Anglicanism’ 
 A number of the bishops we interviewed talked about their surprise at the new 
alliance between Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals on the same side of the sexuality 
question, particularly in North America, but also, though to a lesser extent, in 
England, where they strategic partnerships have formed because of their shared 
opposition to what they identify as ‘the liberal agenda’. Despite their alliance against 
liberals, ‘they’re very very different in the concerns they have about the liberal 
agenda’ (Bishop Peter), as we discussed above. Not only are their specific anxieties 
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different, but so too their style of being Anglican. The GAFCON experience in 
Jerusalem (2008), a meeting of bishops from the ‘Global South’, as well as 
conservative critics from around the world against the acceptance of homosexuality, 
was marked by ‘the astonishment of Evangelicals, who are not used to any liturgy, or 
robes, or anything like that. Suddenly they find themselves in a High Church liturgy, 
both conservative African and High Church Catholic and others, where the host is 
being elevated’ (Bishop David).  
 Of the two GAFCON participants that we have interviewed in the project to 
date, one, an evangelical, emphasised the great unity among the ‘orthodox Anglicans’, 
or ‘historic, orthodox Anglicans’ who participated in the event. The other, a 
conservative Anglo-Catholic, was somewhat less sanguine. He suggested that among 
the conservative dissidents,  
I think there is tension. For instance, there were people [at GAFCON] who 
ordained women and people there who didn’t ordain women. And the 
declaration itself recognizes it and says that you work through those kinds of 
things. Whether the tension will be greater than the need for unity is the 
question. I don’t know the answer to that. But yes, undoubtedly, people who 
are in some ways unlike each other now see the need to hang together 
(GAFCON participant 2).    
 
The Jerusalem declaration was produced as the key statement emerging from the 
GAFCON conference in Jerusalem. Rather than simply being the expression of a self-
evident ‘Anglican Orthodoxy’, this is a compromise document, an attempt to create 
Anglican Orthodoxy by means of compromise between conservative Evangelicals and 
conservative Anglo-Catholics, each of whom have historically emphasised different 
(and even contradictory) elements of the Anglican tradition.  
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 The fourteen points of the Jerusalem Declaration, which is formulated as a 
statement of faith for Orthodox Anglicans, includes apostolic succession and the four 
Ecumenical Councils for the Anglo-Catholics, and the 39 Articles for the 
Evangelicals. The Declaration’s statement on the Bible in particular, betrays this 
attempt to suture together the two traditions: “The Bible is to be translated, read, 
preached, taught and obeyed in its plain and canonical sense, respectful of the 
church’s historic and consensual reading” (GAFCON 2008 no. 2). It is far from 
obvious that the Evangelicals’ ‘plain sense’ and the Catholics’ canonical, historic and 
consensual readings mean the same thing, or are so readily reconciled with one 
another.  
 The declaration inserts a statement intended to exclude same sex marriage 
between a statement on clerical orders and the Great Commission. Given the 
importance of homosexuality as a marker of the liberalism that both groups oppose, it 
is inconceivable that the Conference would not have included it in its major statement. 
Otherwise, there might be Anglicans who could probably agree with the statement as 
a whole, but who might take a different view on the question of sexuality, or who 
might at least not see it as an issue that is worth a schism. 
 
Constructing the Opposition 
 Conservatives often present ‘liberal’ as a self evident, and common-sense 
category. For those who are so marked, it is not always nearly so obvious what it 
means to be ‘liberal’. Bishop David, who identifies himself an Evangelical, feels that 
he is often discredited by his fellow religionists because he sees homosexuality as a 
matter of adiaphora, an issue over which there can legitimately be disagreement in 
the church. Describing the response of some of his fellow Evangelicals to his attempt 
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to avoid the polarising terms of the debate on homosexuality, he often finds himself 
castigated as a ‘liberal’, an identification he does not accept. 
 Bishop Timothy, who does identify himself as a ‘Liberal’, finds that the notion 
of what it means to be ‘liberal’ is caricatured both within and without communities 
that think of themselves in this way. Conservatives, he says, often treat Liberals as if 
they are simply accommodating to whatever the culture dictates. Conservatives can 
then set themselves against whatever they see as ‘liberal’ accommodating positions, 
and might thereby think of themselves as standing ‘in a position over and against the 
world’, and as taking a principled stand.  
 Bishop Kevin expressed some doubt about whether ‘liberal’ was a meaningful 
designation outside of the parameters of the current conflict, and as such a group has 
been identified by the new alliance of conservative Evangelicals and traditionalist 
Anglo-Catholics. He asks 
to what extent is ‘liberalism’ an invented category that allows these folks to 
gather, and ignore their own differences? <Hmmm> To what extent is it the 
straw man that they’ve erected to legitimise their own struggle for control of 
the church? When I ask people ‘what is a liberal, in your view?’, I get a 
thousand different answers, except that they’re bad people, and not real 
Christians. We’ve placed ourselves outside the church, and all this. Now if I 
were just to speak personally, I would be, I suppose be a liberal on the 
sexuality issue, but I’m not a liberal on a WHOLE <laughing> lot of other 
things. <yeah>. I’m not a liberal liturgically… I’m not a liberal—I get letters 
from priests in the diocese wanting to throw the communion table open to 
everybody baptised or not. And I say ‘You cannot do that. The Eucharist is the 
meal of the baptised’. And, there’s a lot of pressure on language, and language 
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change, and I am not liberal about that. So I don’t really know if I am a liberal, 
or what one is. So, I suspect it’s a kind of invention, and one of the difficulties 
in this discussion is stereotyping <yes>, and it, of course it happens in all 
directions. I’m not saying that only conservatives do stereotyping. 
The conservatives might provide ‘a thousand different answers’ for why they would 
identify Bishop Kevin as a ‘liberal’ (and there is no doubt that they do), but there is 
one clear point of agreement between Bishop Kevin and his conservative 
interlocutors: that the distinction between the groups is most clearly marked by where 
one stands on the question of homosexuality. This has become the most salient 
symbol of the conflict, a hook onto which the new ‘Orthodox Anglicans’ have 
managed to hang a number of different complaints, and which liberals use to (over) 
simplify the concerns of conservatives. It serves as a salient marker which, in the view 
of those aligning themselves with GAFCON, separates the sheep from the goats and 
the wheat from the chaff. 
 Sometimes this symbolic marker operates even in the absence of the actual 
positions different churches and leaders take on the sexuality question.  Bishop 
Martha, for example, describes how misinformation and misunderstanding have been 
prevalent between different churches within the Communion. During a conversation 
she had with an African bishop at Lambeth 2008: 
 
[He] said at one point, "I don’t understand how [your country] thinks it can 
approve same sex relations!” I said we haven’t. And he said, “Yes you have!” 
To which I answered, "No, actually we haven’t." So I asked him, "Why does 
your church accept that bishops can have more than one wife?" He answered, 
"It doesn’t." So I added: "Well, I have been told that your church does!" He 
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said, "I have been told that your church accepts gays weddings!" I said "It 
doesn’t." He exclaimed, "Why would someone tell me if it wasn’t…" And 
then he stopped and said “Oh…" 
The way that the conflict within the Communion has been constructed, with two 
inherently opposed and mutually exclusive positions is far from an accurate 





 The Anglican Communion is in the process of being reshaped around the 
symbolic marker of homosexuality, creating a new dividing line that joins together 
portions of the Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical parties (oddly enough, those who had 
previously been furthest removed from one another) as “Orthodox Anglicans,” and 
increasingly divides them from Anglican constituencies that they identify as ‘liberals’. 
 This is not simply a re-enactment of the so-called Cultural Wars (Hunter 
1992), if such a bi-polar cleavage in fact ever existed. While there is currently 
something of an emergent bi-polar conflict under way in the churches of the Anglican 
Communion, such a conflict is built upon the conjunction of particular actors 
(particular sections of the Anglo-Catholic Evangelical parties) who have, for a time, 
joined forces. It is not at all clear, however, that their concerns about ‘liberalism’, how 
they understand and configure such a concept, nor their understanding of what it 
means to be a faithful Christian amount to anything like the same thing. Rather, they 
have been able to organise, for the time being at least, around a symbolic boundary 
marker: the church’s response to homosexuality.  
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 To suggest that these are emerging divisions does not mean that they will be 
absolute, nor that, in the end, they will necessarily be final. Much depends, in all 
likelihood, on the successful suturing of conservative Anglo-Catholics and 
Conservative Evangelicals into ‘Orthodox Anglicans’. This term gives expression to 
the attempted merger of conservatives from two radically different wings of the 
church, and was the key rhetoric in the organisation of the GAFCON meeting in 
Jerusalem, as well as in organisations such as the Fellowship of Confessing Anglicans 
(born of GAFCON), the group ‘Anglican Mainstream’, and the new Anglican Church 
in North America, a province for conservatives who have left The Episcopal Church 
and the Anglican Church of Canada. When a prominent Evangelical like J.I. Packer 
(and self-identified heir to the Puritans) is invited to give the commencement address 
at Nashotah House (29 May, 2009), the most Catholic of Anglo-Catholic seminaries 
in the USA, one observes that there are some very serious attempts underway to build 
bridges across the Anglo-Catholic-Evangelical divide. 
 Such developments highlight how the work of Chavez and Kniss helps to 
problematize any simple reduction of the dispute to being primarily over 
homosexuality, or to the American “Culture Wars.” As Chavez observed over 
disputes in the USA over women’s ordination, different parties in the conflict sought 
to articulate a position that enabled them to develop a wider external alliance with 
partners in other denominations, and to position themselves within the national 
religious field as a ‘conservative’ or as a ‘liberal’ denomination. These institutional 
reference groups helped individual denominations maintain or enhance their external 
standing or prestige within the wider community of Christian churches, without 
necessarily having a direct impact on the internal practices of the denomination. The 
difference in the case of the Anglican Communion is that when the different parties in 
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the dispute have sought external support to bolster their cause, they have not needed 
to look outside the Anglican tradition, but have been able to forge alliances across the 
traditional churches parties, and with international partners in other member Churches 
of the Communion. 
 These alliances are forged among groups with a variety of different primary 
concerns. For some the primary concern is the ordination of women; for others, it is 
the marginalization of the authority of Scripture, of the divinity of Jesus, or the call to 
mission and church planting. For others the primary concerns include justice for the 
oppressed and the poor, human rights, or sharing in the open hospitality of the grace 
of God.  Faced with this complex network of different concerns among Anglicans, 
Chaves’ work is helpful for his recognition that the alleged topic of an intra-
denominational quarrel may not be what the quarrel is primarily about. While those 
who rally against the acceptance of homosexuality generally do have reservations 
about same-sex relationships, frequently these are not their principal concern, nor is 
blocking such development their ultimate agenda. In interviews some have even 
expressed serious private reservations about the position taken by their camp. The 
symbol of homosexuality is the public ‘presenting issue’ of the dispute within the 
Communion, but precisely what it symbolises differs among the various parties and 
interest groups within the churches.  
  Kniss’ work on the role of symbols in religious conflict is useful for 
recognizing how, despite the fact that the symbol of homosexuality is a presenting 
issue, once established, it nonetheless can become a ground that subsequently admits 
of no compromise. Having become a concrete signifier for an intense collection of 
differing agendas, the question of homosexuality has an unambiguous impact on 
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church practices like ordination and marriage, so that compromise or minimization of 
the issue has become difficult, if not impossible. 
 Despite the power of the symbol to unify diverse groups, however, the 
conservative coalition is built on what is a potentially unstable theological alliance, 
premised mostly on a shared common enemy. Whether this will be sufficient to hold 
them together, particularly as they separate from the institutions they see as 
dominated by Liberals (the Anglican Church of Canada, and The Episcopal Church). 
There are real sources of latent tension, including not only styles of worship, but 
matters of doctrine. The Evangelicals will likely have difficulty with Anglo-Catholic 
emphases on the doctrine of the church and the nature of the sacraments, their warmth 
of feeling towards Rome, the place they accord the Virgin Mary, and their high view 
of the orders of ministry. The Anglo-Catholics may find more charismatic forms of 
worship, a particular emphasis and hermeneutic toward Scripture (largely devoid of 
reference to the Church Fathers) problematic, as well as the fact that many 
Evangelicals support the ordination of women to both the priesthood (and even the 
episcopate). A further potential ‘deal breaker’ is that in some of the ‘lowest’ 
Evangelical Anglican churches (especially in Sydney, Australia) there is considerable 
support for lay people presiding at the Eucharist: this is without question anathema to 
all Anglo-Catholics, even as it is seen as a point of principle for some Evangelicals. 
By contrast, those Anglicans who seek to inhabit the ideal position of the “via media” 
or to either straddle the boundaries between the Liberal and Anglo-Catholic positions, 
or between the Liberal and Evangelical, will find it increasingly difficult to do so as 
long as the ordination of gay bishops remains the symbolic test for Anglican 
“orthodoxy” or of divine “inclusiveness” 
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 This problematic nature of the symbolic element of the dispute is illuminated 
by Edelman’s distinction between a “referential” and a “condensation” symbol. The 
idea of an “Anglican Orthodoxy” has an apparent resonance among a variety of 
Anglicans in the current climate, and it appears to serve as a powerful rhetorical 
resource for both consolidating alliances and identifying opponents. The emotive 
power of this symbol, however, has no clear and concrete referent, as the differing 
attitudes among our sample of bishops demonstrates. While in the present context, 
symbols like an “Anglican Orthodoxy” is able to serve as a screen for a powerful 
range of hopes and agendas for the future of the Anglican Communion, those who 
mobilize around it will also likely discover that, in future moments or situations, their 
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